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Been Down So Long It Looks Like Up To Me|Richard Fari~ na.
Abstract. Psychologists report that people make choices on the basis of \deci-
sion utilities" that routinely overestimate the \experienced utility" consequences
of these choices. This paper argues that this dichotomy between decision and
experienced utilities may be the solution to an evolutionary design problem.
We examine a setting in which evolution designs agents with utility functions
that must mediate intertemporal choices, and in which there is an incentive
to condition current utilities on the agent's previous experience. Anticipating
future utility adjustments can distort intertemporal incentives, a con
ict that
is attenuated by separating decision and experienced utilities.
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Alex Kacelnik and Luis Rayo for useful discussions.The Evolution of Decision and Experienced Utilities
1 Introduction
People who contemplate living in California routinely report that they expect to
be signicantly happier there, primarily on the strength of California's blissful
weather. People who actually live in California are no happier than the rest
of us (Schkade and Kahneman [15]). Far from being a California quirk, this
\focussing illusion" is suciently widespread as to prompt the conclusion that
\Nothing ... will make as much dierence as you think." [15, p. 345]1
Psychologists interpret these ndings by drawing a distinction between de-
cision utility and experienced utility (e.g., Kahneman and Thaler [7]). Decision
utilities are the utilities that determine (or at least describe, in a revealed-
preference interpretation) our choices. For Schkade and Kahneman [15], these
are the relevant utilities when people contemplate moving to California. Experi-
enced utilities are the rewards we realize once the choices are made. For Schkade
and Kahneman, these are re
ected in the satisfaction reports from people living
in California.
Experienced utilities are of no interest to a ercely neoclassical economist|
decision utilities suce to describe behavior. However, if we are to consider
welfare questions, the dierence may be important. If experienced utilities do
not match decision utilities, should we persevere with the standard economists'
presumption that decision utilities are an appropriate guide to well-being? Or
should we exhort people to work more diligently in discerning their future ex-
perienced utilities, and then use these to override their decision utilities (as
Schkade and Kahneman [15] imply)? Once we have contending utilities (or con-
tending selves, in the common parlance of behavioral economics), such questions
are both inevitable and vexing.
We adopt a positive perspective in this paper, answering the following ques-
tion: Why might we have both decision and experienced utilities in the rst
place? We take an evolutionary approach. We assume that evolution has
equipped agents with utility functions designed to induce tness-maximizing
choices. An agent in our model must make choices in each of two periods that
will (along with random events) determine his tness. Moreover, these choices
give rise to an intertemporal trade-o, in the sense that the optimal second-
period choice depends upon the alternative chosen in the rst period. The
rst-period choice may determine the agent's health or wealth or skill or status,
1The term \focussing illusion" (e.g., Loewenstein and Schkade [9]) refers to a tendency to
overestimate either the salutary or detrimental eects of current choices. This phenomenon
was thrust into the spotlight by Brickman, Coates and Jano-Bulman's [1] study of lottery
winners and paraplegics, and has become the subject of a large literature. See Loewenstein
and Schkade [9] for an introduction and Gilbert [6] for an entertaining popular account.
Attention has also been devoted to the related prospect that people may exhibit a projection
bias (Loewenstein, O'Donoghue and Rabin [8], Conlin, O'Donoghue and Vogelsang [3]). An
agent exhibits a projection bias if he expects his future preferences to be more similar to his
current preferences than will actually be the case.
1for example, which may in turn aect how aggressive the agent should be in
seeking second-period consumption. Evolution equips the agent with a rst-
period utility function providing the decision utilities shaping the rst-period
choice. Evolution also equips the agent with a second-period utility function de-
termining the hedonic rewards he experiences as a result of his rst-period and
second-period choices. This latter function is interpreted as experienced utility,
though it also provides the relevant decision utility for the second period.2 We
show that in general, the decision utility shaping the rst-period choice does not
match the resulting second-period experienced utility. Evolution systematically
misleads the agent as to the future implications of his choices.
Why should evolution build an agent to do anything other than maximize t-
ness, without resorting to con
icting utility notions? Evolution's design problem
is complicated by two constraints. First, there are limits on how large and how
small are the hedonic utilities evolution can give us.3 By themselves, bounds
on utility pose no obstacles. All that matters is that better alternatives get
higher utilities, and we can accommodate this no matter how tight the range of
possible utilities. However, our second assumption is that the agent is likely to
make mistakes when utilities are too close. When alternative 1 provides only a
slightly higher utility than alternative 2, the agent may mistakenly choose al-
ternative 2. As a result, there is an evolutionary advantage to having the utility
function be as steep as possible, so that the agent is dealing with large utility
dierences that seldom induce mistakes. This goal con
icts with the bounds on
utility. Evolution's response is to make the utility function very steep in the
range of decisions the agent is most likely to face, where such steepness is partic-
ularly important in avoiding mistaken decisions, and relatively 
at elsewhere.4
For this is to be eective, the steep spot of the utility function must be in the
right place. In the second period, the \right place" depends on what happens
in the rst period. Evolution thus has an incentive to adjust second-period or
experienced utilities in response to rst-period outcomes. But if this is to be
done without distorting rst-period decisions, the agent must not anticipate this
adjustment|the experienced utilities guiding second-period decisions must not
match the decision utilities shaping rst-period decisions.
Section 2 introduces the evolutionary environment. Section 3 presents the
analysis of decision and experienced utility in the context of a simple model.
Section 4 considers extensions and implications.
2It is relevant in this connection that Carter and McBride [2] argue that experienced utility
has similar empirical properties to decision utility.
3Notice that in taking this position, we are following much of the current literature in
behavioral economics in viewing utility maximization as a neurological process by which we
make choices, rather that simply a description of consistent choices. In particular, our view is
that utilities are induced by chemical processes within our brains that are subject to physical
constraints.
4Robson [13] argues that utility bounds and limited discrimination between utilities will
induce evolution to strategically position the steep part of the utility function. Rayo and
Becker [12] develop this idea in a model that provides the foundation for our work. Tremblay
and Schultz [17] provide evidence that the neural system encodes relative rather than absolute
preferences, as might be expected under limited discrimination. See Friedman [5] for an early
contribution and Netzer [10] and Wolpert and Leslie [18] for more recent work.
22 The Evolution of Utility
2.1 The Evolutionary Environment
There are two periods. The agent makes a choice x1 in the rst period and
x2 in the second. These choices would be multidimensional in a more realistic
model, but here are taken for simplicity to be elements of [0;1]. Whenever it is
helpful in conveying intuition, we (temporarily) adopt particular interpretations
of x1 and x2, such as levels of rst-period and second-period consumption, or
as a decision to move to California (or not) and a subsequent decision of how
much time to spend surng (whether in California or Iowa). We recognize that
our stark one-dimensional variables cannot capture all the subtleties of such
decisions.
The agent's tness is determined by his choices x1 and x2 as well as the
realizations s1 and s2 of environmental shocks in the rst and second periods.
For example, the agent's health may depend not only on eort he invests in
procuring food, but also on vagaries of the weather or stock market aecting
the productivity of these eorts. The agent's rst-period choice x1 must be
made in ignorance of the realization s1, while x2 is chosen knowing s1 but not
s2.
In the absence of any constraints, evolution's task of designing an agent




2() is the optimal mapping from rst-period
outcomes to second-period choices. Why would evolution not simply \hard-
wire" agents to make this optimal decision?
The point of departure for our analysis is the assumption that evolution
cannot hard-wire the alternative (x
1;x
2()), as trivial as this sounds in the con-
text of this model. Our interpretation here is that what it means to choose a
particular value of x1 or x2 changes with the context in which the decision is
made. The agent's choice may consist of an investment in status that some-
times involves hiding food and other times acquiring education, that sometimes
involves cultivating social relationships with neighbors and other times driving
neighbors away. Moreover, the relevant context 
uctuates too rapidly for evo-
lution to adapt. The dominant form of investment can change from clearing
elds to learning C++ too quickly for mutation and selection to keep pace. As
a result, evolution must recognize that the agent will frequently face problems
that are novel from an evolutionary perspective.5
5Rayo and Becker [12] similarly confront the question of why evolution cannot hard-wire
agents to make optimal choices. They assume that the evolutionarily optimal action depends
upon an environmental state, and that there are so many possible values of this state that it is
prohibitively expensive for evolution to hard-wire the agent to condition actions on every value.
Our assumption that the state is entirely novel is equivalent, diering from Rayo and Becker
primarily in emphasis. Rayo and Becker explicitly include the state variable within their
model, while we sweep it into the background, simply assuming that evolution cannot dictate
optimal choices, in order to simplify the notation. Their simplest model, which corresponds to
our basic model, then makes the analysis more tractable by assuming that the state variable
aects optimal actions but not maximal tness.
3To capture this constraint, we need to specify the technology by which the
agent's decisions are converted into tnesses. Our point of departure is the
relationship
z = z1 + z2;
dening the agent's realized total tness z as the sum of realized rst-period
tness z1 and the discounted value of realized second-period tness z2, with the
discount factor  perhaps re
ecting a nonunitary survival probability. At this
point, however, we note that it requires only a change in the units in which z
and z1 are measured to normalize the discount factor to be unity, and hence to
rewrite this equation as z = z1 + z2. This signicantly simplies the following
notation and so we we adopt this convention throughout. We then write
z = z1 + z2 (1)
= [f1(x1) + s1] + [
z1 + f2(x1;x2) + s2]: (2)
The rst line presents our normalized accounting of tness. The second line
indicates that rst-period tness is a quasilinear function of the rst-period
action x1 and realization s1. For example, x1 may re
ect an investment in
skills, and z1 the resulting expertise, or x1 may re
ect actions taken in pursuit
of status, and z1 the resulting place in the social order. Second period tness is
similarly a quasilinear function of the second-period action x2 and realization
s2, and also a function of both the rst-period action x1 and tness z1. A
relatively large value of x1 may re
ect a rst-period investment that enhances
the productivity of x2 in the second period. In addition, a relatively large rst-
period tness z1 may carry over directly into a higher second-period tness,
regardless of how z1 is achieved. An agent who is better-nourished in the rst
period may enjoy the salutary eects of good health in the second. Section 4.2
describes how quasi-linearity can be generalized.
Technically, the key distinction is that, while evolution cannot attach utilities
to the agent's choices x1 and x2, she can attach utilities to total tnesses. Times
have changed too quickly for evolution to attach utility to passing through the
drive-through coee line in the morning, but she can reward the resulting feeling
of alertness.
We assume the expected tness f1 and f2 are strictly concave. This ensures
the existence of unique expected tness maximizers x
1 and x
2(x1), which we
take to be interior. We assume that s1 and s2 are realizations of independent
random variables ~ s1 and ~ s2 with zero means and with dierentiable, symmetric
unimodal densities g1 and g2, with zero derivatives only at 0. Our results go
through unchanged, and with somewhat simpler technical arguments, if ~ s1 and
~ s2 have unbounded supports.
Finally, we should be clear on our view of evolution. We adopt through-
out the language of principal-agent theory, viewing evolution as a principal who
\designs" an incentive scheme in order to induce (constrained) optimal behavior
from an agent. However, we do not believe that evolution literally or deliber-
ately solves a maximization problem. We have in mind an underlying model
in which utility functions are the heritable feature dening an agent. These
4utility functions give rise to frequency-independent tnesses. Under a simple
process of natural section respecting these tnesses, expected population tness
is a Lyapunov function, ensuring that the type maximizing expected tness
will dominate the population. If the mutation process generating types is su-
ciently rich, the outcome of the evolutionary process can then be approximated
by examining the utility function that maximizes expected tness, allowing our
inquiry to focus on the latter.
2.2 Utility Functions
Evolution can endow the agent with nondecreasing utility functions V1(z) and
V2(zjz1). In the rst period, the agent considers the realized total tness z pro-
duced by the agent's rst-period and anticipated second-period choice, reaping
utility V1(z). In the second period, the agent's choice induces a realized total
tness z and hence corresponding utility V2(zjz1). Notice in particular that evo-
lution can condition second-period utilities on the realization of the rst-period
intermediate tness z1. Through the technology given by (1){(2), V1 and V2
implicitly become utility functions on x1, x2, s1 and s2.6
To interpret these utility functions, let us return to our moving-to-California
decision. We think of V1(z) as representing the utility the agent contemplates
should he move to California, taking into account his projections of how much
surng he will do once there. V2(zjz1) is the utility the agent realizes, once
he has moved to California. We think of the former as the decision utility
mediating the rst choice, and the latter as the resulting experienced utility. If
these functions are identical, we have no focussing illusion.
In the absence of any additional constraints (beyond the inability to write
utilities directly over x1 and x2), evolution's utility-function design problem is
still trivial. She need only give the agent the utility functions
V1(z) = z
V2(zjz1) = z:
As straightforward as this result is, we believe it violates crucial evolutionary
constraints that we introduce in two steps. Our rst assumption is that evolution
faces limits on how large or small a utility she can induce. Our view here is that
utilities must be produced by physical processes, presumably the 
ow of certain
chemicals in the brain. The agent makes choices leading to a tness level z, and
receives pleasure from the resulting cerebral chemistry. There are then bounds
on just how strong (or how weak) the resulting sensations can be. Without loss,
we assume that utilities must be drawn from the interval [0;1].7
6Our view is that the agent eectively learns which values of x1 and x2 lead to high utilities,
in the process coming to act \as if" the agent \knows" the functions f1 and f2.
7Evidence for bounds on the strength of hedonic responses can be found in studies of how
the ring rate of neurons in the pleasure centers of the brain respond to electrical stimulation.
Over an initial range, this response is roughly linear, but eventually high levels of stimulation
cause no further increase. See, for example, Simmons and Gallistel [16].
5The constraint that utilities be drawn from the unit interval poses no dicul-
ties by itself. Essentially, evolution need simply recognize that utility functions
are unique only up to linear transformations. In particular, in this case evolution
need only endow the agent with the utility functions
V1(z) = A + Bz
V2(zjz1) = A + Bz;
where A and B are chosen (in particular, with B suciently small) so as to
ensure that utility is drawn from the unit interval, no matter what the feasible
values of x1, x2, s1 and s2.
We now add a second constraint to evolution's problem|there are limits
to the ability of the agent to perceive dierences in utility. When asked to
choose between two alternatives whose utilities are very close, the agent may
be more likely to choose the alternative with the higher utility, but is not cer-
tain to do so. This is in keeping with our interpretation of utility as re
ecting
physical processes within the brain. A very slightly higher dose of a neuro-
transmitting chemical may not be enough to ensure the agent 
awlessly chooses
the high-utility alternative, or there may be randomness in the chemical 
ows
themselves.8 In particular, we assume that there is a possibly very small "i such
that in each period i, the agent can be assured only of making a choice that
brings him within "i of the maximal utility. We will then be especially inter-
ested in the limits as the utility errors "i ! 0. It may well be, of course, that
such errors are not small in practice. However, we are interested in the role of
utility constraints in driving a wedge between decision and experienced utilities,
and especially interested in the possibility that such a wedge could arise despite
arbitrarily small errors.
The utility functions V1 and V2 both take z as their argument. In the rst
period, z is the agent's anticipation of his total tness, given his actions. Does
this give rise to a realized utility V1(z), inducing the same brain processes as
if the agent had actually secured tness z? Or does the anticipation trigger a
dierent process that simply allows the agent to expect that utility V1(z) will
be forthcoming should z be realized in the second period, and to maximize
the payo induced by the expected future brain activity? A similar question
arises in the second period. The action x1 and realization s1 are now known,
but second-period decisions must still be made before s2 is realized and z de-
termined, and hence must be guided by anticipations o the resulting utility
V2(z). Again, is the result an immediate reward, or is the behavior shaped by
expectations of future rewards? Neuroscience is currently silent as to how an-
ticipated outcomes (over spans of more than a few seconds) aect brain activity
8Very small utility dierences pose no problem for classical economic theory, where dier-
ences in utility indicate that one alternative is preferred to another, with a small dierence
serving just as well as a large one. However, it is a problem when utilities are induced via
physical processes. The psychology literature is lled with studies documenting the inability
of our senses to reliably distinguish between small dierences. (For a basic but vivid textbook
treatment, see Foley and Matlin [4].) If the dierence between two chemical 
ows is arbitrarily
small, we cannot be certain that the agent will invariably choose the larger.
6and behavior. Our analysis accommodates various interpretations. Whether V1
and V2 represent anticipations whose underlying physical processes are qualita-
tively dierent from those accruing when z is nally realized, or whether the
anticipations of z give rise to immediate utility realizations analogous to those
received when z is realized (or something in between), the result is that evolu-
tion has both V1 and V2 available as instruments to induce tness-maximizing
behavior.
3 Decision and Experienced Utility
3.1 The Second Period
The agent enters the second period having made a choice x1 and realized a
rst-period tness of z1. The agent cannot distinguish any pair of second-period
choices whose expected utilities are within "2 > 0 of each other. Hence, instead
of certainly choosing the maximizer x
2 of E~ s2V2(z1 +(
z1 +f2(x1;x2)+ ~ s2)jz1)
in the second period, the agent may choose any x2 yielding an expected utility




z1+f2(x1;x2)+~ s2)jz1)  "2:
This give rise to a satiscing set [x2;x2], where x2 < x
2 < x2 and
E~ s2V2((1 + 
)z1 + f2(x1;x2) + ~ s2jz1) (3)
= E~ s2V2((1 + 
)z1 + f2(x1;x2) + ~ s2jz1)
= E~ s2V2((1 + 
)z1 + f2(x1;x
2) + ~ s2jz1)   "2: (4)
To keep things simple, we assume the agent chooses uniformly over this set.9
It would be more realistic to model the utility perception error "2 as propor-
tional to the maximized expected tness, rather than as an absolute error. Doing
so has no eect on our analysis. In particular, we can interpret "2 as the \just
noticeable dierence" in utilities induced by the equilibrium of the proportional-
errors model, and then simplify the notation by writing the constraints as in
(3){(4), while retaining the proportional interpretation of the errors.
Evolution chooses the utility functions V2 to maximize tness, subject to (3){
(4). We summarize the result of this maximization process with the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 There exist functions Z2(z1) and Z2(z1), with Z2(z1)  Z2(z1),
such that the optimal second-period utility function satises
V2(zjz1) = 0; for all z < Z2(z1) (5)
V2(zjz1) = 1; for all z > Z2(z1): (6)
9We could work with a more general assumption about how the choice from the satiscing
set is made, but must preclude the possibility that an attempt by evolution to improve the
agent's decisions by increasing x2 and decreasing x2 is thwarted by agent's pushing more and
more of her choice probability toward these boundaries.
7In the limit as "2 ! 0, the agent's second-period choice x2 approaches x
2(x1).
Let us interpret some aspects of this result before turning to the proof.
Notice rst that if "1 > 0, then x1 arises out of random satiscing behavior
in the rst period, but nonetheless the second-period choice (when "2 ! 0) is
x
2(x1), for each realization x1.
The values Z2(z1) and Z2(z1) depend on z1. This allows evolution to ad-
just the second-period utility function in order to maximize its eective slope,
minimizing the incidence of mistaken decisions.
Lemma 1 leaves open the question of how the utility function is specied on
the potentially nonempty interval (Z2(z1);Z2(z1)). In the course of examining
the rst period, we will show that this gap shrinks to zero as does "1, the rst-
period utility-perception error. In particular, the gap (Z2(z1);Z2(z1)) arises
because evolution faces uncertainty concerning agent's rst-period choice x1.
As "1 ! 0, this uncertainty disappears, and in the process Z2(z1) and Z2(z1)
converge. We thus approach a bang-bang utility function, equalling 0 for small
tnesses and 1 for large tnesses.
The bang-bang limiting character of this utility function may appear ex-
treme, dooming the agent to being either blissfully happy or woefully depressed.
Notice, however, that the expected utilities with which the agent evaluates his
choices do not have this property. The expected utility function E~ s2V2((1 +

)z1 + f1(x1;x2) + ~ s2jz1) is a continuous function of x2 (given x1 and z1).
We now present and discuss the argument behind Lemma 1. Let us rst
remove a complication by supposing (temporarily) that evolution can condition
the second-period utility function on the agent's rst-period choice x1 as well
as his rst-period tness z1 (with the assumption concerning x1 dropped in the
last paragraph of this section). In the second period, the agent chooses from
the satiscing set [x2;x2]. Let f2 be the utility the agent reaps from a choice
at the boundary of this set (and hence f2 = f2(x1;x2) = f2(x1;x2), where
the second equality follows from (3){(4) and the fact that E~ s2V2 is strictly
increasing in f2). Let f
2 the the utility from the tness-maximizing choice (and
hence f
2 = f2(x1;x
2)). The agent's second-period tness will be higher the
smaller is the satiscing set [x2;x2], or equivalently the larger is f2.
The problem is then one of maximizing f2, subject to the constraints given
by (3){(4). The constraints given by (3){(4) can be written as10
"2 =
Z
V2(zjz1)[g2(z   [(1 + 
)z1 + f
2])   g2(z   [(1 + 
)z1 + f2])]dz: (7)
10We can reduce (3){(4) so a single constraint because f2(x1;x2) = f2(x1;x2). To arrive





2) + s2jz1)g2(s2)ds2  
Z
V2((1 + 





2) + s2jz1)g2(s2)ds2  
Z
V2((1 + 
)z1 + f2(x1;x2) + s2jz1)g2(s2)ds2:
A change of the variable of integration from s2 to z then gives (7).
8Now let us x a candidate value f2 and ask if it could be part of an optimal
solution. If we could choose a utility function V2(zjz1) so as make the right
side of (7) exceed "2, then the candidate value f2 would give us slack in the
constraints (3){(4), and the utility function in question would in fact induce a
larger value of f2 than our candidate (since the right side of (7) is decreasing
in f2). This would imply that our candidate value does not correspond to an
optimal utility function. Hence, the optimal utility function must maximize the
right side of (7), for the optimal value f2, in the process giving a maximum
equal to "2. We now need only note that (7) is maximized by setting the utility




0 and by setting the utility V2(zjz1) as large as possible when this inequality
is reversed, and hence the optimal utility function must have this property.
Because g2 has a symmetric, unimodal density with nonzero derivative (except
at 0), there is a threshold ^ Z2(z1) 2 [(1 + 
)z1 + f2;(1 + 
)z1 + f
2] such these
dierences are negative for lower values of z and positive for higher values of z.
This gives us a utility function V2(zjz1) that takes a jump from 0 to 1 at ^ Z2(z1).
As "2 ! 0 and hence the agent's satiscing set shrinks, ^ Z2(z1) converges to
(1+
)z1 +f
2 and the agent 
awlessly maximizes f2(x1;x2)by choosing x
2(x1).
To acquire some intuition, notice that the optimal utility function exhibits
features familiar from principal-agent problems. In particular, consider a hidden-
action principal-agent problem with two eort levels. It is a standard result that
the optimal payment attached to an outcome is increasing in the outcome's like-
lihood ratio, or (intuitively) in the relative likelihood of that outcome having
come from high vs. low eort. Much the same property appears here. Evolution
would like expected utility to fall o as rapidly as possible as the agent moves
away from the optimal decision x
2(x1), thereby \steepening" the utility func-
tion and reducing the possibility of a mistakenly suboptimal choice. Evolution
does so by attaching high payments to tnesses with high likelihood ratios, or
(intuitively) outcomes that are relatively likely to have come from an optimal
rather than a suboptimal choice.
The key property in characterizing the utility function in our case is then
a single-crossing property, namely that the relevant likelihood ratios fall short
of one for small tnesses and exceed one for large tnesses. The likelihood
comparison appears in dierence rather than ratio form in (7), but the required
single-crossing property is implied by the familiar monotone likelihood ratio
property, that
g2(z )
g2(z) is increasing in z, for  > 0.
This would give us Lemma 1 (and more), were it not for our counterfactual
assumption that evolution can \observe" x1 as well as z1. Because second-period
utilities cannot be conditioned on x1, evolution must form a posterior expecta-
tion over the likely value of x1, given her observation of z1.11 She would then
choose a utility function V2(zjz1) that maximizes the agent's expected tness,
given this posterior. In particular, for each possible value of x1, the agent will
11We emphasize again that evolution does not literally form posterior beliefs over the agent's
actions and then solve an optimization problem. The results follow from the observation that
tness will be maximized by that utility function that would be optimal given the appropriate
posterior beliefs.
9mix over a set [x2(x1);x2(x1)], being the satiscing set corresponding to (3){(4)
(for that value of x1). Evolution is concerned with the resulting expected value of
the total tness (1+
)z1+f2(x1;x2)+s2, where the expectation is taken over the
likely value of x1 (given z1), over the choice of x2 (from the resulting satiscing
set), and the draw of s2 (governed by g2). Evolution increases expected tness
by reducing the size of the satiscing sets [x2(x1);x2(x1)]. While this is in gen-
eral a quite complicated problem, the key observation is that there exists a value




is negative for z < Z2(z1), for every x1 in the rst-period satiscing set, as well
as a value Z2(z1) such that these dierences are all positive for all z > Z2(z1).12
It thus decreases the size of every possible satiscing set to set V2(zjz1) = 0 for
z < Z2(z1) and V2(zjz1) = 1 for z > Z2(z1). This leaves us without having
determined what happens on the set [Z2(z1);Z2(z1)], and if there is a wide
range of possible x1 values, this gap might be large. As "1 gets small, however,
the rst-period satiscing set will shrink, causing the gap [Z2(z1);Z2(z1)] to
disappear (cf. Lemma 2). Finally, even for xed (but small) "1 > 0, it follows
from the fact that V2(zjz1) is increasing and the continuity of f2 that as "2
approaches zero, the agent's second-period satiscing sets collapse on x
2(x1),
for each realization x1 of the rst-period random satiscing choice.
3.2 The First Period
Attention now turns to the rst period. For simplicity, we take the limit "2 ! 0
before considering the optimal rst-period utility function, returning to this
assumption at the end of this section.
The agent has a utility function V1(z) with V1 2 [0;1]. In addition, the agent
cannot distinguish any pair of choices whose expected utilities are within "1 > 0
of each other. This again leads to a random choice from a satiscing set [x1;x1],
where
E~ s1;~ s2V1(f1(x1) + ~ s1 + [
(f1(x1) + ~ s1) + f2(x1;x
2(x1)) + ~ s2]) (8)
= E~ s1;~ s2V1(f1(x1) + ~ s1 + [
(f1(x1) + ~ s1) + f2(x1;x
2(x1)) + ~ s2])
= E~ s1;~ s2V1(f1(x
1) + ~ s1 + [
f1(x
1) + ~ s1) + f2(x1;x
2(x
1)) + ~ s2])   "1: (9)
In the rst period, the agent randomizes uniformly over the set [x1;x1]. Evolu-
tion chooses the utility function V1(z) to maximize expected tness, subject to
(8){(9).
Once again, we have a bang-bang function in realized utilities, with the
expected utility function E~ s1;~ s2V1(f1(x1)+~ s1+[
(f1(x1)+~ s1)+f2(x1;x
2(x1))+
~ s2]) being a continuous function of x1. Section 5.1 uses arguments parallelling
those applied to the second period to prove:
12This follows from the observation that f2 is bounded, and hence so are the values [(1 +

)z1 + f2(x1;x
2(x1))] and [(1 + 
)z1 + f2(x1;x2(x1))] = [(1 + 
)z1 + f2(x1;x2)], over the set
of possible satiscing values of x1, with the former larger than the latter.
10Lemma 2 There exists a value ^ Z1 such that the optimal rst-period utility func-
tion is given by
V1(z) = 0; for all z < ^ Z1
V1(z) = 1; for all z > ^ Z1:
In the limit as "1 ! 0, we have

















The nal part of this lemma resolves a lingering question from the preceding
analysis of the second period, showing that the intermediate range [Z2;Z2] on
which we had not pinned down the second-period utility function disappears
as "1 tends to zero and hence the randomness in the agent's rst-period choice
disappears.
The ideas behind this result parallel those of the second period. The utility
perception error "1 causes the agent to choose x1 randomly from a satiscing set
[x1;x1], and evolution's task is to choose the utility function to reduce the size
of this satiscing set. Total tness is now aected by the random variable ~ s1 as
well as ~ s2, and the key to the result is to show that the resulting distribution
over total tness exhibits a single-crossing property, with larger total tnesses
relatively more likely to have come from the tness-maximizing choice x
2 than
from either of the choices x1 or x1.
Putting our two intermediate results together, we have shown:
Proposition 1 In the limit as the \utility-perception errors" "2 and then "1
approach zero, the optimal utility functions are given by






















We thus have bang-bang utility functions in each period. The jump in the
second-period function is adjusted in response to the agent's rst-period tness
outcome, shifting upward whenever the agent has a more favorable rst-period
outcome z1 and shifting downward in response to disappointing rst-period
outcomes. Intuitively, this allows evolution to adjust the steep part of second-
period expected utility to occur in the range of decisions likely to be relevant
in the second period, in the process strengthening the second-period incentives.
11As the utility-perception errors "1 and "2 get small, the agent's choices collapse
around the optimal choices x
1 and x2(x
1).
Our argument can be easily adapted to establish Proposition 1 under the
assumption that "2 goes to zero suciently fast relative to "1 (as opposed to
taking "2 ! 0 rst). Indeed, we can establish Proposition 1 no matter how the
utility-perception errors "1 and "2 go to zero, with additional technical assump-
tions and a somewhat more involved argument. In order to evaluate the utility
consequences of his rst-period actions, the agent must know what his subse-
quent second-period actions will be. Taking "2 to zero before examining the rst
period, as we have done, simplies the argument by allowing the agent to unam-
biguously anticipate the choice x
2(x1) in the second period. What should the
agent anticipate if "2 > 0? His second-period choice will now be a random draw
from a satiscing set. An apparently natural assumption would give the agent
rational expectations about his second-period choice. However, the satiscing
set is determined by the second-period utility function, and under the separa-
tion of decision and experienced utilities, the agent does not correctly anticipate
the second-period utility function governing the choice of x2.13 It is then con-
ceptually problematic to assume rational expectations. Whatever rule evolution
gives the agent for anticipating second-period choices, we will obtain the results
given in Proposition 1 as long as random second-period choices do not reverse
rst-period tness rankings. In particular, the tness-maximizing rst-period
choice x
1 gives a distribution of total tnesses that rst-order stochastically
dominates the distribution induced by the suboptimal choices x1 or x2, when
each is paired with the corresponding optimal second-period choice x
2(). It
would suce for a general limit result that for "2 > 0 (but small), the optimal
choice x
1 still gives tnesses that rst-order stochastically dominate those of x1
or x2; given the rule used by the agent to anticipate second-period choices.14
One obvious sucient condition for this to hold is that f2(x1;x2) be separable
in x1 and x2 (with the agent's anticipated second-period choice then naturally
being independent of x1). Other sucient conditions would allow more 
exible
technologies, at the cost of more cumbersome statements.
3.3 Comparing Decision and Experienced Utilities
We now compare the agent's decision and experienced utilities|are the utilities
guiding the agent's decision the same as those the agent will experience when
the resulting outcome is realized?
To answer this question, suppose the agent considers the possible outcome
(x1;s1;x2;s2). For example, the agent may consider moving to California (the
choice of x1), learning to surf (the choice of x2), nding a job (the realization
13Notice that in the limit as "2 ! 0, it need only be the case that second-period expected
utility will be increasing in tness to ensure that x
2(x1) will be chosen in the second period,
making rational expectations straightforward.
14Total tness would then continue to exhibit the appropriate version of the single-crossing
property given by (19){(20), with the agent's belief about x2 as well as those about ~ s1 and
~ s2 now being random.
12s1) and enjoying a certain amount of sunshine (the realization s2). Let us
assume the agent anticipates choosing x2 optimally in the second period, so
that x2 = x
2(x1). Then x x1 and look at utility as s1 and s2 vary. If the
outcome considered by the agent gives (1+
)[f1(x1)+s1]+f2(x1;x2)+s2 > ^ Z1,
then he attaches the maximal utility of one to that outcome. However, if the
scenario contemplated by the agent at the same time involves a value s2 < 0 (the
agent contemplates a good job realization and hence a success without relying
on outstanding weather), then his realized experienced utility will be zero, since
then
z = (1 + 
)z1 + f2(x1;x
2(x1)) + s2 < (1 + 
)z1 + f2(x1;x
2(x1))
=) V2(zjz1) = 0:
The agent's decision utility of one thus gives way to an experienced utility of
zero.
Alternatively, if the agent considers a situation where (1+ 
)[f1(x1)+s1]+
f2(z1;x2)+s2 < ^ Z1, then this generates a decision utility level of zero. However,
if, at the same time s2 > 0, his experienced utility will be one.
The agent's decision and experienced utilities will thus sometimes agree, but
the agent will sometimes believe he will be (maximally) happy, only to end up
miserable, and sometimes he will believe at the start that he will be miserable,
only to turn out happy. The agent will be mistaken about his experienced utility
whenever his utility projection depends more importantly on the rst-period
choice than second-period uncertainty (i.e., anticipating a good outcome because
he is moving to a great location, regardless of the weather; or anticipating a bad
outcome because his location is undesirable, despite good weather). The agent's
decision utilities fail to take into account that once the rst-period choice has
been realized, his utility function will adjust to focus on the second period,
bringing second-period realizations to heightened prominence.
Could this focussing illusion in realized outcomes be washed out in the pro-
cess of taking expected values? Suppose we know simply that the agent con-
templates a rst-period utility V1(z) for some specic z. This is the type of
information typically provided by empirical studies that begin by soliciting de-
cision utilities. What expectations should we have concerning this person's
second-period utility? Let us suppose the agent chose x
1 in the rst period
and will choose x
2(x
1) in the second, both because we expect to observe people
who have made optimal choices (given their decision utilities), and because the
continued existence of the focussing illusion in the presence of optimal choices is
of key interest. This leaves us uncertain as to the likely values of s1 and s2. We
can let E~ s1;~ s2 fV2(zj~ z1)jzg represent our expectation of the agents' second-period
utility, given the observation of z. Then in general,
V1(z) 6= E~ s1;~ s2 fV2(zj~ z1)jzg (10)
= PrfV2(zj~ z1) = 1jzg (11)












Figure 1: First-period decision utility function V1(z) and expected experienced
utility E~ s1;~ s2 fV2(zj~ z1)jzg, as a function of z. Observations of small decision
utilities will then on average give way to larger experienced utilities, while large
decision utilities will on average give way to smaller experienced utilities, giving
rise to a focussing illusion.
The larger is z, the more likely it is that ~ s2 > 0. As a result, E~ s1;~ s2 fV2(zj~ z1)jzg
increases from 0 to 1 as z increases from its minimum to its maximum value.
Figure 1 illustrates.
An agent's view of the utilities guiding his rst-period decisions thus give
way to a more moderate view of second-period experienced utilities.
3.4 Separable Decisions
The technology z2 = 
z1 + f2(x1;x2) + s2 encompasses two links between the
rst and second period, with second-period tness being larger the better is
the agent's rst-period outcome, and with the optimal second-period decision
depending on the rst-period action. Both links are intuitive, but the rst alone
is capable of generating a focussing illusion. What matters is that second-period
utility depends on the rst-period outcome, not that second-period optimal
behavior depends on the rst-period outcome.
14Suppose that realized tness is given by
z = z1 + z2 (13)
= f1(x1) + s1 + [
z1 + f2(x2) + s2]; (14)
where s1 and s2 are again realizations of random variables. Then the optimal
value of x2 is independent of x1 and z1. Nothing from the rst period is relevant
for determining the agent's optimal second-period decision. However, second-
period tness does depend on the rst-period outcome.
Following the analysis of Sections 3.1{3.2, evolution's optimal design features
a second-period utility function of
V2(zjz1) = 0; for all z < ^ Z2(z1)
V2(zjz1) = 1; for all z > ^ Z2(z1);
where, in the limit as "2 gets small, ^ Z2(z1) = (1 + 
)z1 + f2(x
2). In the rst
period, we get
V1(z) = 0; for all z < ^ Z1
V1(z) = 1; for all z > ^ Z1;
where ^ Z1 = (1 + 
)f1(x
1) + f2(x
2) (as "1 ! 0). Once again, second-period
utility functions adjust in response to rst-period outcomes, ensuring a focussing
illusion.
3.5 Sophisticated Agents?
Evolution here has designed the agent to be naive (cf. O'Donoghue and Rabin
[11]), in the sense that the rst-period decision is made without anticipating the
attendant second-period utility adjustment. Why not make the agent sophisti-
cated? Why not simply let the agent make decisions on the basis of experienced
utilities?
Given optimal second-period choices, and taking the limit as the utility errors
tend to zero, evolution induces the agent to make an appropriate rst-period
choice by having the agent select x1 to maximize
E~ s1;~ s2V1(~ z) = Pr[(1+








E~ s1;~ s2V1(~ z) is readily seen to be maximized at x
1. Suppose that instead, evolu-
tion designed the agent to maximize the expected value of the correctly antici-
pated, expected experienced utility, or





The agent's decision utility captures two eects relevant to choosing x1, namely
the eect on rst-period tness z1, with implications that carry over to the
second period, and the eect on expected second-period incremental tness
15f2(x1;x
2(x1)). In contrast, the correctly anticipated experienced utility omits
the rst consideration. Expected experienced utility thus leads the agent to
consider only the second-period implications of his decisions, potentially yielding
outcomes that dier markedly from those that would maximize tness. Making
agents naive increases their tness.
To illustrate this point, suppose that maxx2 f2(x1;x2) is independent of x1,
though the maximizer may yet depend on x1. Hence, the action the agent must
take to maximize second-period incremental tness depends on the outcome of
the rst period, though in each case the agent adds the same expected increment
to tness. In the limiting case of no utility error, we have








for every value of x1. Correctly anticipated experienced utility now provides
no incentives at all, while rst-period decision utilities still eectively provide
incentives. Why does making the agent sophisticated destroy incentives? The
naive agent believes that a suboptimal choice of x1 will decrease utility. Should
such a suboptimal choice x1 be made, however, the agent's second-period util-
ity function will (unexpectedly) adjust to the rst-period choice x1 to still yield
an expected experienced utility of 1
2. From evolution's point of view, this ad-
justment plays the critical role of enhancing second-period incentives. Should
the agent be sophisticated enough anticipate it, however, rst period incen-
tives evaporate, with expected utility now being independent of the rst-period
choice.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Evolution must create in-
centives in the rst period, and naturally constructs decision utilities to penalize
suboptimal choices. However, once a rst-period alternative is chosen, evolution
must now induce the best possible second-period choice. In the present model,
she adjusts the agent's utility function in response to the rst-period choice,
causing the optimal second-period choice to induce the same expected utility,
regardless of its rst-period predecessor. Suboptimal rst-period choices thus
lead to the same experienced utility in the second period as do optimal ones.
The decision-utility penalty attached to suboptimal choices in the rst period
is removed in the second in order to construct better second-period incentives.
4 Discussion
4.1 Extensions
We have highlighted the forces behind the focussing illusion by working with a
stark model. A number of extensions would be of interest. Some of these are
conceptually straightforward, even if they are analytically more tedious. For
example, we would be interested in a model spanning more periods, allowing
us to examine a richer collection of investment opportunities. As our model
stands, a rst-period investment x1 already yields its gains in the second period.
16What about more prolonged investments? It may take sucient time to acquire
an education that the agent rst becomes accustomed to a low consumption
level, magnifying the initial utility consequences of the education's consumption-
enhancing aftermath, only to have them subsequently eroded.15 Evolution must
now construct a sequence of utility functions, each serving as a decision utility
for current actions and an experienced utility for past actions.
Similarly, it would be interesting to allow z1 and z2 (as well as x1 and x2) to
be multidimensional. We derive utility from a variety of sources. Perhaps most
importantly, we can ask not only how evolution has shaped our utility func-
tions, given their arguments, but which arguments she has chosen to include.
At rst, the answer to this question seems straightforward. The currency of
evolutionary success is reproduction, and evolution should simply instruct us to
maximize our expected reproductive success. Even if one could solve the atten-
dant measurement issues,16 maximizing this goal directly is presumably beyond
our powers.17 Instead, evolution rewards us for achieving intermediate targets,
such as being well-fed and being surrounded by aectionate members of the
opposite sex. But which intermediate targets should evolution reward? Clearly,
our utility functions should feature arguments that, to the extent possible, are
directly related to the ultimate goal of reproductive success and are suciently
straightforward that we can perform the resulting maximization. In addition,
we will suggest below that our utility functions should contain arguments that
are eective at implicitly conveying information to evolution.
4.2 A More General Technology
Quasi-linearity is not needed at all for the second-period analysis. The critical
step in the rst-period argument arises in examining the cumulative distribution
function of (1 + 
)~ s1 + ~ s2. Letting G denote this distribution, we have
G(z   [(1 + 
)f1(x1) + f2(x1;x
2(x1))]
= Pr[(1 + 
)~ s1 + ~ s2]  z   [(1 + 
)f1(x1) + f2(x1;x
2(x1))]
= Pr[(1 + 
)(f1(x1) + ~ s1) + f2(x1;x
2(x1)) + ~ s2  z]: (15)
Now letting g be the density of G, we can interpret g(z   [(1 + 
)f1(x1) +
f2(x1;x
2(x1))]) as the \1ikelihood" that tness z is the result of choices (x1;x
2(x1)),
which give rise to expected tness (1 + 
)f1(x1) + f2(x1;x
2(x1)). Paralleling
the second-period argument, it would suce for this distribution to have the
15The relevant measure of the length of a period is determined by the how quickly evolution
can induce our utility functions to adapt to our circumstances. A single ne meal is unlikely
to be a preference-altering event, but it may not take long for one to feel \settled" in their
circumstances, prompting drift in the \steep spot" of the utility function.
16For example, how do we trade o the number of children versus their \quality," presumably
self-referentially dened by their reproductive success? How do we trade o children versus
grandchildren?
17Calculating the tness implications of every action we take would be overwhelming, while
feedback (such as the birth of a healthy child) is suciently rare as to make trial-and-error
an ineective substitute (cf. Robson [14]).





1))])   g(z  
[(1 + 
)f1(x1) + f2(x1;x
2(x1))]) is negative for small values of z (in which case
V1(z) = 0) and positive for large values (giving V1(z) = 1), for which it suf-
ces that g exhibit the monotone likelihood ratio property. Intuitively, higher
realized tness levels must be relatively more likely to have come from actions
yielding higher expected tness levels. Under the quasilinearity assumption (2),
the cumulative distribution function of tness in (15) is derived immediately
from the cumulative distribution function G of the relatively simple linear com-
bination (1 + 
)~ s1 + ~ s2 of the random variables ~ s1 and ~ s2. This ensures (as we
show in Section 5.1) that the corresponding density g exhibits the single-crossing
property.
Now suppose tness is given by z = z1 + z2 = f1(x1;s1) + f2(z1;x2;x2;s2).
This general technology will give rise to an analogous utility function if the
counterpart of (15) again gives rise to a single crossing property. However, now
we must dene the cumulative distribution function of tness directly as
^ G(z) = Pr[f1(x1; ~ s1) + f2(f1(x1; ~ s1);x1;x
2(f1(x1; ~ s1);x1); ~ s2)  z]:
In this case, ^ G is the cumulative distribution of a potentially complicated, non-
linear function of ~ s1 and ~ s2. We can then no longer automatically count on ^ G
exhibiting the requisite single-crossing property. Instead, this property is now
a potentially complicated joint assumption on the distributions or the random
variables and the technology. Simple sucient conditions for this property are
then elusive, though we have no reason to doubt that higher realized tnesses
will again be relatively more likely to have emerged from actions yielding higher
expected tnesses.
We believe there are good reasons to expect the desired single-crossing prop-
erty to hold, even if the primitive conditions leading to the requisite monotonic-
ity property are not easily identied in the general model. Bringing us back
to ideas which we opened Section 4, evolution has not only designed our util-
ity functions, but has chosen the arguments to include in those functions. We
have been chosen to have a taste for sweetness, whereas we could just as eas-
ily have been chosen to have dierent tastes. Among the many considerations
behind what gets included in our utility functions, we expect one to be that
the technology surrounding the variable in question exhibits the single-crossing
properties required for simple utility functions to deliver strong incentives. We
thus expect the single-crossing property to be one of the features that makes a
variable a good candidate for inclusion in our utility function, and hence think
it likely that the property will hold precisely because evolution has an incen-
tive to attach utilities to variables with this property. Once we have that, we
immediately reproduce the results of Section 3.2 in the more general setting.
4.3 Alternative Utility Functions
We have assumed that evolution writes rst-period and second-period utility
functions of the form V1(z) and V2(zjz1). What if evolution could write util-
ity functions of the form V1(z1;z2) and V2(z1;z2)? Notice that the dierence
18between the second-period utility functions V2(zjz1) and V2(z1;z2) is one of
notation only|allowing a function of z = z1 + z2 to be conditioned on z1 is
equivalent to allowing V2 to depend on z1 and z2. In the rst period, allowing
z1 and z2 to enter the utility function separately potentially opens new possi-
bilities. In a special case of our question, why not write the utility function as
V1(z1), i.e., why make the agent farsighted at all?
Consider rst the technology given by (13){(14). Then evolution can do no
better than to give the agent the utility functions (in the limit as "1 ! 0 and
"2 ! 0)
V1(z1) = 0; for all z1 < ^ z1 = f1(x
1)
V1(z1) = 1; for all z1 > ^ z1 = f1(x
1)
V2(zjz1) = 0; for all z < ^ Z2(z1) = (1 + 
)z1 + f2(x
2)
V2(zjz1) = 1; for all z > ^ Z2(z1) = (1 + 
)z1 + f2(x
2):
In this case, there is no need to trouble the agent with second-period implications
when the agent is making his rst-period choice, as the rst-period action x1
has no second-period implications. The rst-period tness z1 still carries over
into the total tness achieved in the second period, but this does nothing but
reinforce the conclusion that the agent should maximize rst-period tness.
Do we have a focussing illusion here? On the one hand, the second-period
utility cuto ^ Z2(z1) adjusts in response to rst-period realized tness z1, ensur-
ing that the agent will often encounter second-period tness realizations that
do not match his previous expectation of second-period utility. However, only
rst-period outcomes and utilities shape the rst-period choice. In particular,
it would make no dierence whether this agent were naive or sophisticated. It
is as if V1(z1) is both the decision and experienced utility for the choice of x1.
Perhaps the best description is that we have a focussing illusion, but an irrele-
vant one. No one in this setting would expect people to make better decisions
were they better in touch with their experienced utilities.
This utility-design procedure would run into diculties with the technology
given by (1){(2) (and hence our concentration on the former in the bulk of this
paper). Here, not only z1 but the rst-period choice x1 enters the second-period
tness. It no longer suces to simply design the agent to maximize the expected
value of rst-period tness z1, as the agent must trade o higher values of z1
with the second-period implications of x1. Maximizing total tness may require
settling for a lower value of expected rst-period tness, in order to invest in
a level of x1 that boosts expected second-period tness. Of course, evolution
need not design the utility function to maximize the expected value of z1. It
may be that the optimal value of x1 is consistent with an expected rst-period
tness value f1(x
1), and that evolution could design a utility function that is
not monotonic in z1 and whose maximized expected value equals f1(x
1). Even
if this were feasible, however, there would still in general be more than one value
of x1 consistent with f1(x
1), so that simply hitting the right value f1(x
1) does
19not suce to maximize tness. This problem is likely to be all the more severe in
more realistic, multidimensional models. The obvious solution to this problem
is to simply write rst-period utility as a function of z = z1 +z2, leading to our
model.
4.4 Smooth Utility Functions
The optimal utility functions in our model assign only the utilities zero and
one to realized outcomes. Can we obtain realized utilities that are not always
zero or one? To see why this is important, note that the gist of a focussing
illusion is that anticipations of high utilities give way to lower realizations, and
anticipations of low utilities give rise to higher realizations. When anticipated
utilities are always set at either their minimum or maximum value, it seems that
one can hardly avoid such an outcome. Should we expect the focussing illusion
to survive in a more realistic model?
To demonstrate how to do this, we begin with the model of Section 3.4.
The key new feature is the addition of a shock ~ r that is observed by the agent
before the rst choice must be made but is unobservable to evolution. This
shock captures the possibility that there may be characteristics of the agent's
environment that aect the agent's tness, but that 
uctuate too rapidly for
evolution to directly condition his behavior. The agent may know whether the
most recent harvest has been good or bad, or whether the agent is in the midst
of a boom or recession. Fitness thus varies with a state that is unobserved by
evolution (as in Rayo and Becker [12]). Suppose that realized tness is given by
z = r + z1 + z2
= r + f1(x1) + s1 + [
z1 + f2(x2) + s2];
where the associated random variables ~ s1; ~ s2 and ~ r are independent.
Two assumptions signicantly simplify the analysis. First, ~ r takes only a
nite number of possible outcomes (r1;:::;rK). Our second assumption, made
precise after acquiring the required notation, is that the dispersion in the values
of ~ r is large relative to the supports of ~ s1 and ~ s2. Intuitively, the new information
in ~ r the agent can observe is relatively important.
The agent is endowed with a second-period utility function V2(zjz1). This
is non-decreasing in tness z, where V2(zjz1) 2 [0;1]. Suppose that z1 has
been realized in the rst-period and the agent has observed realization rk of the





E~ s2V2((1 + 
)z1 + f2(x
2) + rk + ~ s2)   E~ s2V2((1 + 
)z1 + f2(xk
2) + rk + ~ s2) (16)
= E~ s2V2((1 + 
)z1 + f2(x
2) + rk + ~ s2)   E~ s2V2((1 + 
)z1 + f2( xk









g2(z   (1 + 
)z1   f2(x






We could similarly rewrite (17), but the fact that f2(xk
2(z1)) = f2(xk
2(z1)) allows
us to work with (18) alone throughout. Dene Zk
2(z1) by the requirement that
g2(Zk
2(z1)   (1 + 
)z1   f2(x
2)   rk) = g2(Zk
2(z1)   (1 + 
)z1   f2(xk
2)   rk):
Since g2 is symmetric and unimodal (with nonzero derivative except at 0), there
exists a unique such Zk
2(z1) 2 [(1 + 
)z1 + f2(xk
2) + rk;(1 + 
)z1 + f2(x
2) + rk].
If we could x the value of rk, we would then have precisely the problem of
Section 3.4. Evolution would set V2(zjz1) = 0 for z < Zk
2(z1) and V2(zjz1) = 1




2)+rk as "2 ! 0. Now, however,
we have not just one such problem, but a collection of k such problems, one
corresponding to each possible value of rk. At this point, we simplify the inter-
action between these problems by invoking our assumption that the successive
values of rk are sparse, relative to the support of ~ s1 and ~ s2, so that for each value





2) rk) nonzero. Equivalently, each possible realization rk
gives rise to a set of possible realizations of ~ z (conditioning on z1 throughout),
each of which can arise from no other realization of ~ rk. On this set of values,
evolution would like to set V2(zjz1) as low as possible for z < Zk
2(z1), and as
high as possible for z > Zk
2(z1). The implicit constraint behind the \if possible"
in these statements is that V2(z) must be non-decreasing. Hence, for example,
setting V2(zjz1) relatively low for a value z < Zk
2(z1) relevant for the realiza-
tion rk, while improving incentives conditional on realization rk, constrains the
incentives that can be provided for smaller realizations.
These observations immediately lead to the conclusion that, given z1 and "2,
there will be an ascending sequence of values (V 0
2 ;:::;V K
2 ) such that
V2(zjz1) = V 0
2 = 0 for all z < Z1
2(z1)
V2(zjz1) = V k
2 for all z 2 [Zk
2(z1);Z
k+1
2 (z1)); k = 1;:::;K   1
V2(zjz1) = V K
2 = 1 for all z  ZK
2 (z1):
In the limit as "2 ! 0, we have Zk
2(z1) ! (1 + 
)z1 + f2(x
2) + rk, and hence, a
utility function given by
V2(zjz1) = 0 for all z < (1 + 
)z1 + f2(x
2) + r1
V2(zjz1) = V k
2 for all z 2 [(1 + 
)z1 + f2(x
2) + rk;(1 + 
)z1 + f2(x
2) + rk+1); k = 1;:::;K   1
V2(zjz1) = 1 for all z  (1 + 
)z1 + f2(x
2) + rK:
The remaining task is then to calculate the values V 1
2 ;:::;V
K 1
2 . It is
straightforward to write the programming problem these values must solve and
to nd conditions characterizing the equilibrium. In general, however, these are
21quite complex. Section 5.2 presents an example in which enough structure is
imposed on the problem to admit a simple closed-form solution.
The rst period situation is analogous to that provided above. Evolution's
criterion is then E [(1 + 
)f1(x1) + ~ s1 + f2(x
2) + ~ s2 + ~ r] = (1 + 
)Ef1(x1) +
f2(x
2), given optimal choice in the second period, but allowing for random
satiscing behavior in the rst. In the limit where "1 ! 0, it then follows that




V1(z) = V k






2)); k = 1;:::;K   1




where the values V k
1 ;k = 0;:::;K match those of the second period.
The utility functions V1 and V2 now increase in K steps, becoming nearly
smooth as K gets large. Once again, it is optimal to dissociate rst period utility
V1(z) from second period utility V2(zjz1). Each utility function in the second
period is a replica of the utility function in the rst period, being a horizontal
translation of the rst period utility function by the random shock (1 + 
)~ s1,
whose mean is zero. It can be shown that, in each neighborhood of each jump
point, the rst-period utility function V1(z) is more extreme than the expected
second-period function EV2(zj~ z1). Indeed, the argument is essentially identical
to that used when utilities had a single jump.
4.5 Implications
Psychologists and classical economists tend to approach the concept of utility
from dierent perspectives. Psychologists are more apt to give utility a direct
hedonic interpretation, and to be comfortable with the idea of multiple forms of
utility. Classical economists are more inclined to think of utility as an analytical
device, and to always work with only a single notion of utility. Recent advances
in behavioral economics have highlighted this apparent contradiction.
Our analysis suggests that if we interpret utility as having an evolutionary
origin, in the process embracing the hedonic interpretation, then we should
expect a distinction between decision and experienced utility. Psychologists
are prone to go further, arguing that decisions would be improved if decision
utility were replaced by expected experienced utility. Our model provides no
support for this view. Decision and experienced utilities combine to produce
tness-maximizing choices. To an observer, the resulting choices will exhibit
all the characteristics of rational behavior, including satisfying the revealed-
preference axioms (as long as the utility errors are suciently small, and with
tness as the underlying utility function), despite the seeming inconsistencies
between decision and experienced utilities. Replacing the resulting decisions
with choices based on experienced utilities can only reduce tness.
Of course, maximizing tness may not be the relevant goal. There is no
compelling reason why conscious beings should, as a moral imperative, strive
to maximize the tness criterion implicitly guiding their evolution. Once we
22abandon tness, however, we are left with little guide as to what the appro-
priate welfare criterion should be, and little reason to think that emphasizing
the tness-maximizing experienced utilities should yield a welfare improvement.
One might respond by arguing that experienced utility is the appropriate cri-
terion, but we see little reason for singling out one particular utility function as
the appropriate one.
What implications does our model have? Evolutionary explanations of be-
havior are intriguing, but provide their most convincing payo when pointing
to behavior implications that would hitherto have gone unnoticed. Training
people to place greater emphasis on experienced utilities will alter the incen-
tives to make investments in future utility. In particular, suppose we consider
actions whose costs and benets are unevenly spread over time. The action may
involve costly current eort that pays o in the form of future consumption, or
current consumption requiring future compensatory eort. Our comparison of
naive and sophisticated agents in Section 3.5 suggests that in our two-period
model, making agents sophisticated will cause them to emphasize the future
utility impacts of their actions, as they realize that the current utility gains
or losses will be ratcheted away by future utility adjustments. Their decision
making will then rely more heavily on the current implications of their choices.
In essence, sophisticated agents are likely to appear to be more patient.
Consider the following example. Let f1(x1) =  x2
1 and f2(x1;x2) = 8x1(x2 
x2
2). We can think of x1 as an investment, with current cost  x2
1, that pays o




sophisticated agent recognizes that any rst-period utility impacts of x1 will be
oset by second-period utility adjustments, and hence chooses x1 to maximize






to pressure to choose the largest possible value of x1 = 1. This agent thus gives
the appearance of being \hyper-patient," ignoring rst-period considerations
altogether. Suppose instead we have f1(x1) = x1 and f2(x1;x2) = x2  x2
2  x2
1,
so that rst-period tness gains are purchased at the cost of second-period costs.
Training the agent to rely on experienced utility will again give rise to hyper-
patience, in this case inducing the agent who ignores the potential rst-period
benets to choose x1 = 0. Either scenario involves potentially disastrous tness
consequences. A richer model in which agents could be \partially sophisticated"
might give rise to intermediate levels of enhanced patience, while models with
more periods may give rise to more subtle impacts.
18The agent chooses x
2 = 1
2, in the second period. In the rst period, given that the utility












5.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Taking "2 ! 0. ensures that, for any rst-period choice x1, the agent anticipates
x
2(x1) as the second-period choice.
The rst step of the proof now parallels that of the second period, and is to
rewrite the constraints as
Z Z
V1(f1(x
1) + s1 + 
[f1(x






V1(f1(x1) + s1 + 





1) + s1 + 
[f1(x






V1(f1(x1) + s1 + 
[f1(x1) + s1] + f2(x1;x
2(x1)) + s2)g1(s2)g2(s2)ds2
= "1:
The next task is to execute the corresponding change of variable to rewrite these
constraints as
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where g is the density of the random variable (1 + 
)~ s1 + ~ s2.
This ensures that there exists a ^ Z1 with the property that V1(z) = 0 for
z < ^ Z1 and V1(z) = 1 for z > ^ Z1, if we can show that g is symmetric and







The next step of the proof is to establish that g indeed has the required
properties. It is clear that these properties are preserved under multiplication
by a nonzero scalar, so it suces to show that if two arbitrary random variables
~ s1 and ~ s2, with densities g1 and g2, have these properties, then so does their
sum. Let s = s1 + s2 for feasible values of s and dene:
2(s) = maxfs2;s   s1g
2(s) = minfs2;s   s1g:
24Notice that 2(s) < 2(s) and that, from symmetry, s1 =  s1 and s2 =  s2:


















We say that 2 is relevant if 2 > s2 (and irrelevant otherwise), and that
2 is relevant if 2 < s2. Dierentiating, we have (note that 2 > s2 =)
G1(s   2) = 1 and 2 = s2 =)
d2



























g1(s   s2)g2( s2)ds2 =
Z 2(s)
2(s)
g1(s   s2)g2(s2)ds2 = g(s):
Unimodality, and the presence of a zero derivative only at zero, follow from
taking another derivative to obtain:
G00(s) = g1(s   2)g2(2)
d2
ds








It suces to show that the rst line is nonnegative and the second line positive
when s < 0, with the reverse holding when s > 0. We present the case for




ds = 1 if 2 and 2 are both relevant, and that an irrelevant
term gives a zero derivative. Because s > 0, it must be that either (i) only 2
is relevant (in which case the rst line is nonpositive), (ii) neither 2 nor 2
is relevant (in which case it is zero) or (iii) both are relevant (in which case
g1(s   2) = g1(s1) = g1(s1) = g1(s   2) and g2(2) < g2(2), with the rst
line then again being nonpositive).
Consider the second line. This expression is obviously negative if s 2(s) >













25The nal term on the right is clearly nonpositive, and so we concentrate on the

















1(s1)[g2(s   s1)   g2(s + s1)]ds1;
which is negative since g0
1(s1) is negative for s1 > 0 and g2(s s1) g2(s+s1) is
positive for s;s1 > 0, completing the argument that g has the desired properties.
5.2 Calculations for Section 4.4
We assume that the functions fi are given by
fi(xi) =  jx
i   xij;i = 1;2 (21)
so that agents pay a linear penalty for straying away from the optimal choice.
Let p1;:::;pK be the probabilities of r1;:::;rK, respectively. We can per-











2   V k
2
; k = 1;:::;K 1;
where G2 is the cumulative distribution function of ~ s2. Evolution's problem is
to choose the nontrivial utilities fV k
2 g
K 1




where k is the expected tness of an agent who has observed rk and now
chooses from a uniform distribution over the set [xk
2;xk
2].




























= 0; k = 1;:::;K   1:
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for k = 1;:::;K   1.




















2(z1) ! (1 + 
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f2(x
2) + rk. In this limit, then
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